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The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) is a multi-satellite 
operational system which both uses the Space Transportation System (STS) as a 
launch vehicle and provides key tracking and data communications services to 
STS flights. Since the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) was 
originally designed for an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) launch, the STS 
requirements provided many difficult challenges both technically and 
programmatically. The time span of the TDRS development was roughly in the 
same time span as the development of STS operations, and, being one of the 
first STS payloads, the TDRS and the STS matured together, pioneering many of 
the features incorporated into this launch system today.
This paper describes the history of the TDRS and STS relationship, the unique 
considerations which were required of the TDRS Program, and the design 
drivers which were imposed on the TDRS as the program matured and 
subsequently as the STS was re-evaluated as a consequence of the Challenger 
accident. The in-advance preparations and coordination is detailed as are 
the pre-launch and launch activities required to fly on an Orbiter. The 
advantages as well as disadvantages of flying on a manned launch vehicle are 
detailed, and the paper ends with advice and recommendations based on lessons 
learned. It is hoped that this paper will give some insight into how 
yesterday's vision of a reusable launch vehicle evolved into today's 
operational launch system, and how yesterday's vision of a space-based 
Tracking and Data Relay System has replaced the Ground Spaceflight Tracking 
and Data Network (GSTDN) Stations, providing markedly improved data rates and 
orbital coverage for today's users including the STS.
INTRODUCTION
The TDRSS provides the primary means that NASA has to communicate with and 
gather data from most of its low Earth orbiting missions. This includes the 
great observatories, Hubble Space Telescope (HST), Gamma Ray Observatory 
(GRO) and Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), as well as the STS, 
Landsat and the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE). Indeed, the TDRSS is an 
integral part of most of NASA's near-Earth missions now and for the 
foreseeable future. The Earth Observing System (EOS) and Space Station 
Freedom missions will rely on TDRSS for the bulk of their two-way 
communications and orbital tracking needs.
The TDRSS is a series of geosynchronous satellites maintained and operated by 
a ground station located at White Sands, New Mexico. These satellites relay 
data from the White Sands Ground Terminal (WSGT) to user spacecraft. Since 
the TDRS's are in a geosynchronous orbit, they maintain constant contact with 
the ground station and have direct line-of-sight communication with user 
spacecraft throughout most of their orbit. These communications are 
implemented through either one of the two TDRS Single Access Antennas, which 
are steered in the direction of a user, or by using the Multiple Access array 
which electrically forms a beam to a user. The Single Access system is 
operated at either K-Band or S-Band while the Multiple Access system is 
restricted to S-Band only. Another vital part of the operational TDRSS is 
the Network Control Center (NCC) at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). 
The NCC is responsible for scheduling the services provided by the TDRSS and 
for providing a two-way data and operations interface to the TDRSS users.
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The history of the TDRSS goes back to the early 1970's when the 
communications and data gathering services for low-Earth orbit missions were 
provided by a world-wide network of ground stations which would track user 
spacecraft as they went overhead in their orbits. In the early days of NASA, 
these ground stations, which provided low data rate transmission capability 
over about 15% of a typical users orbit, were adequate in meeting user needs. 
As data transmission rates grew substantially and requirements for extended 
contact times with users also grew, the existing network of ground stations 
was no longer up to the task. Additionally, since these ground stations were 
necessarily located in sovereign foreign countries, political and economic 
problems in supporting and maintaining these stations were exponentially 
increasing. Today, the TDRSS provides coverage of about 85% of a typical 
users orbit at data transmission rates exceeding 300 Mbps. In fact, each 
TORS has the capability of transmitting the data equivalent of a 24-volume 
encyclopedia in less than six seconds. The original contract for the TORS 
required the spacecraft to be designed to support a dual role. In addition 
to the TDRSS mission, a commercial K-Band and C-Band communications 
capability was required. However, due to programmatic considerations, the 
commercial mission was terminated prior to the launch of the first TDRS.
Presently, the TDRSS on-orbit constellation consists of five spacecraft. The 
F-l was launched in 1983 and is about to be retired from general TDRSS 
service and will be dedicated to special support for the GRO mission. In 
this capacity, the F-l will be moved out of view of the WSGT and will be 
operated remotely through its own unique and dedicated mini-terminal located 
in Australia. The F-4 and F-5 Spacecraft, launched in 1989 and 1991, 
respectively, are presently carrying the bulk of the TDRSS workload and are 
augmented on occasion by the F-3. The F-3 Spacecraft, launched in 1988, is 
only partially operational due to an on-orbit failure of one of the high data 
rate K-Band links. The F-6 Spacecraft, which was just launched in January of 
this year, is being stored on-orbit as a ready reserve spacecraft should 
something happen to either F-4 or F-5. These spacecraft were all built for 
NASA by TRW of Redondo Beach, California.
The TDRSS ground station located in White Sands, New Mexico, is operated and 
maintained by GTE and provides the functions of controlling the on-orbit 
spacecraft as well as relaying data to and from user control centers to 
on-orbit user spacecraft. The ground station is operated 24 hours a day, 365 
days a year. A contingent of about 300 persons, 5 civil servants and 295 
contractor personnel working for GTE, Bendix and TRW, man the station to 
maintain operations. Presently, the station operates the system with an 
efficiency in excess of 99%. That is, more than 99% of user requests for 
services which have been accepted by the NCC scheduling system, are actually 
provided to the user. Scheduling of TDRSS service to users is usually done 
weeks in advance although some limited amounts of quickly scheduled service, 
to accommodate user spacecraft emergency needs, are also available.
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Since the TDRSS is an integral part of most other NASA missions, plans are in 
place to maintain and even augment the system through the foreseeable future. 
In the near term, an F-7 TORS is being readied at TRW for a mid-1995 launch, 
A few years from now, when the EOS and Space Station Freedom are on orbit, 
the TDRSS is planned to operate four active geosynchronous spacecraft with a 
fifth spacecraft on orbit in ready reserve. To achieve this expanded 
capability, the Agency is now building a Second TDRSS Ground Terminal (STGT), 
also located at White Sands, New Mexico, and is planning a procurement of 
several new TDRS's. The STGT is expected to be operational in 1994 and 
additional spacecraft of a new design are expected to be available for launch 
in the late 1990's.
All of the present generation of TORS were designed to be launched by the STS 
and taken into geosynchronous orbit with a Boeing-built Inertia! Upper Stage 
(IUS). As of this date, five spacecraft have been successfully launched 
using the STS. The remainder of this paper expands on the development of the 
relationship between the STS and the TORS.
HISTORY - A STORY OF FIRSTS
The original contract specified that the first three TDRS's would be launched 
on Atlas-Centaur which were fully developed operational vehicles. The final 
three of the original buy of six was planned to be launched on the 
STS/Space Shuttle Upper Stage-A, later changed to the STS/IUS, all of which 
were still under development at the time of the contract start.
Sometime after the preliminary spacecraft design had been developed, but 
still relatively early in the contract, it became clear that the spacecraft 
design was outgrowing the Atlas-Centaur load capability. Spacecraft weight 
growth was driven by a change in requirements in the K-Band and C-Band 
commercial services and made necessary a shift of the first three TORS to the 
STS/IUS. Although STS/IUS requirements and parameters were not yet firm, the 
fixed price nature and system development schedules of the TDRSS mandated a 
continuation of design and implementation efforts of the TORS. By the time 
the STS/IUS requirements were firmed up, the TORS design was frozen and 
implementation of the F-l and F-2 Spacecraft was well on its way. Since the 
TORS F-l was only the second payload of the STS, it was very difficult to 
anticipate the kinds of problems which would develop.
In order to lay down a baseline for TDRS/STS/IUS activities, a Payload 
Integration Plan (PIP) and nine annexes were written and rewritten many 
times. A special Interface Control Document (ICD) had to be developed in 
order to interface the TORS with the IUS and subsequently with the STS. The 
ICD effort was very difficult since there were so many new players and no 
guidelines for such an integration effort. Changes were continuous. Now, 
standards exist and the changes are relatively few.
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Since the TORS was originally designed to fly on an ELV, minimal attention 
was initially paid to the stringent man-rated safety requirements. After 
signing on with the STS, we found that safety policy and requirements of the 
STS were being constantly revised, making necessary significant and expensive 
design changes to spacecraft already being built. Today, the requirements 
are well developed and quite firm so that new users know up front what their 
safety design goals are. In particular, in the original design, the TORS 
Spacecraft ordnance firing circuitry did not have the necessary two-fault 
tolerant safety inhibits as required by STS safety considerations. This 
problem required extensive redesign of TORS circuitry, permeated through 
several fixed-price contracts and subcontracts and required physical rework 
of much of the in-process hardware. Integrated Test Procedures, now called 
Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMI's), had to be developed without 
any existing standards for content or format; in addition, basic test 
philosophy was still evolving. Customer stand-alone test procedures which 
were necessary to support the OMI's needed to be written but could not 
because the format of the OMI, which the stand-alone test procedure 
interfaced with was not defined. On F-l/STS-6, the procedures were written 
over and over again. Additionally, many deviations were written during the 
actual launch Integration and Test flow. Today, very few procedural changes 
occur.
Early on in the program for F-l, extensive effort was required in order to 
convince the management of both the launch vehicles and the TORS that, prior 
to launch, an end-to-end test was required to verify that the spacecraft and 
the various ground terminals and networks played together. It was argued 
that this type of testing was unnecessary and too costly. It was finally 
agreed that the community would support the tests providing that the user pay 
the costs. Today, no one would think of launching a primary spacecraft 
without end-to-end tests.
F-l was the first payload to be processed through the Vertical Processing 
Facility (VPF) and launch pad. The VPF facilities were in fairly good shape, 
the operations well planned, and the clean room cleanliness met the user 
requirements. The launch pad and specifically the Payload Changeout Room 
(PCR), which is part of the Rotating Support Structure (RSS), required 
extensive redesign in order to maintain cleanliness specifications after F-l 
was launched. During the time when F-l was on the Pad, a severe storm passed 
through. The movement of the tower was not In sync with the movement of the 
Orbiter; as a result, seals designed to maintain a positive pressure within 
the PCR did not do their job. Moisture and particulate matter entered the 
PCR and contaminated the TORS. TORS was cleaned on the Pad and subsequently 
launched. Today, after extensive modifications to the PCR and the 
implementation of good clean room procedures, the PCR is really an excellent 
clean room.
There were a lot of firsts with the launch of the TORS:
o The first to use the VPF, particularly the transfer of a 47,000 pound 
payload into the transportation canister.
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o The first to run end-to-end tests, the first test revealed such 
severe problems with the supporting communications network elements 
that, had we launched without the end-to-end test, there would have 
been serious on-orbit problems communicating with the spacecraft 
through the launch vehicle communications links.
o The first to move to the launch pad in a canister, be erected at the 
PCR, transferred into the PCR and subsequently into the Orbiter cargo 
bay. These operations were pretested by KSC using a dummy load. 
However, when the 47,000 pound load of the TDRS/IUS was transferred 
into the Payload Ground Handling Mechanism (PGHM), it revealed 
misalignments in the PGHH which caused the load to shift several 
inches. This caused some major excitement.
o F-l was the first spacecraft to be fueled in the PCR at the Pad.
o F-2 was the first spacecraft to experience a flight hardware problem 
on the Pad that would necessitate removing the spacecraft from the 
Pad for repair. No one had ever backed out of a launch flow before; 
consequently, procedures to accomplish the tasks were either not 
prepared or were not in a usable state. Essentially the entire 
forward going flow from the VPF to the Pad had to be reversed. 
Procedures were written under severe pressure because there was 
another payload waiting in the wings and KSC needed to clear the Pad.
The spacecraft had to be defueled on the Pad.
With the tanks still wet with a small quantity of residual fuel, 
the payload was removed from the PCR and moved to the VPF.
Once in the VPF work stands, the TORS was demated from the IUS 
and transported to an explosive/safe area where considerable 
disassembly of the spacecraft was required to accomplish the
repair.
Once repaired, the spacecraft was stored under purge for more 
than six months waiting to re-enter the launch flow. The
React ion Control System was stored with minor residual fuel in
the system during the entire time.
After learning all of the pioneering lessons before and during the F-l launch 
and the education which was obtained as a result of the F-2 stand-down, 
things have gone very well from the launch integration standpoint. Presently 
F-3, F-4, F-5 and F-6 have all been launched using techniques and procedures 
largely developed for the F-l and original F-2 efforts. (After the original 
F-2 stand-down, the F-2 came back and went through a smooth launch 




As a launch system, the STS offers a rather benign ride to its customers 
imposing relatively mild structural and thermal engineering requirements. 
However, since it is a man-rated system, the safety requirements on the 
design and implementation of a user spacecraft are enormous and, as a result, 
are significant cost drivers. For the TORS, when the initial contractual 
launch vehicle was switched from an ELV to the STS, we took on some major 
upgrade activities within several spacecraft subsystems. The TORS pressure 
vessels (containing hydrazine at about 340 Ibs/square inch pressure) although 
designed with ample margin for an ELV launch, needed to be proof-tested and, 
in one case, needed to be subjected to an ultimate burst test to adequately 
demonstrate their man-rated qualification. The commanding system and its 
operations especially in the way that on-board ordnance commands were 
processed, had to be re-designed. All systems which could have an impact on 
STS safety must be two-fault tolerant. On the TORS, certain ordnance and 
propulsion subsystem commands are hardware inhibited during the time that the 
TORS is on-board the STS. While in the STS payload bay, inadvertent radio 
frequency radiation, especially since it may impact ordnance safety, is also 
of great concern. The hydrazine fueling, always a high profile safety 
operation, now came under new scrutiny because of the planned fueling on the 
launch pad. Fracture control was imposed on every one of the structural 
members of the spacecraft, its appendages and the launch vehicle adapter. 
Fracture control is a process whereby each individual part on each individual 
flight spacecraft is subject to analysis, testing, or a combination thereof 
to verify that it was manufactured in a way which will not allow it to fail 
under launch or launch abort loads. (For the TORS launch on the STS, the 
abort or return from orbit loads are the driving condition. These loads are 
significantly greater than the predicted launch loads.) All of these items 
collectively had a huge impact on TORS schedules and costs.
PREPARATIONS AND COORDINATION
Perhaps the greatest lesson learned from the many TDRS launches on the STS is 
the need for early coordination through preparation and a continued dialogue 
between all responsible entities. As in virtually all other complex 
technical and programmatic matters, the first definitions of TDRS/IUS/STS 
interface problems and their early solutions were found to be inadequate. 
Early understandings developed into misunderstandings which required large 
expenditures of resources and energy to resolve. Only tight coordination and 
constant preparations allowed the eventual resolution of all problems prior 
to the first launch. Our present method of preparation and coordination is 
to designate specific interfaces within the three organizations and maintain 
life in those interfaces through scheduled meetings on a semi-annual basis 
even when launch is not imminent. When we get within nine months or so of a 
launch, interface meetings or teleconferences are held on a monthly basis 
even when major problems do not exist. If major concerns develop, daily 
teleconferences and meetings can be common.
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PRE-LAUNCH ACTIVITY
The pre-launch activity for a TDRS starts with the arrival of the spacecraft 
via a C-5A aircraft 90 days prior to the scheduled launch date. Upon 
arrival, the spacecraft is set up in the VPF where it receives a mechanical 
look-over and is then electrically connected to its test set. Those 
spacecraft subsystems which are normally activated during the actual launch 
are then checked out to verify their continued readiness. Upon a complete 
checkout of those subsystems (the TDRS Communications Payload cannot be 
activated in the launch configuration and remains off until the spacecraft 
has been deployed on orbit) the spacecraft is mechanically and then 
electrically mated to the IUS. This activity also takes place in the VPF. 
After mating IUS/TDRS interface testing is performed with both the TDRS and 
the IUS in nearly launch-ready configuration, tests of data flows are made to 
the controlling centers of each system and a final review to determine 
readiness to proceed is also held. After the TDRS/IUS combination is tested, 
the entire stack, at this point weighing in at nearly 47,000 Ibs., is 
transported vertically to the launch pad. At the Pad, the stack is lifted to 
the PCR and, when the Orbiter is moved to the launch pad, the TDRS/IUS 
combination is placed into the payload bay of the Orbiter. Hydrazine 
fueling, a final pre-launch battery reconditioning, and trickle charging are 
done on the Pad.
When mechanically and electrically installed in the payload bay of the 
Orbiter, a series of end-to-end tests involving the STS, the IUS, and the 
TDRS is performed. The controlling centers of each system are brought on 
line and all launch-required systems are checked out. This portion of the 
pre-launch activity can bring about unwelcome surprises even with good 
pre-coordination. Generally on the STS, two or more payloads can be 
co-manifested and at this point in the launch flow these payloads start 
coming together for the first time. Since the processing is done with the 
payloads and the STS in a vertical attitude, those payloads closest to the 
STS cabin will be physically directly above the other payloads in the PCR. 
This can bring about many concerns such as the accidental dropping of 
material or tools. For the TDRS, we have insisted upon and received 
custom-manufactured debris shields which are affixed directly above the 
delicate TDRS Spacecraft and its stowed appendages and protect the TDRS from 
activities physically above the spacecraft.
LAUNCH ACTIVITY
The TDRS launch window starts In the morning hours and is limited to be less 
than three hours in length. The morning constraint is levied by a 
combination of STS preference (the transatlantic abort landing sites are in 
daylight) and thermal constraints of the TDRS (the sun look angles post 
launch and during deployment from the STS). The length of the window is 
limited by the STS crew-on-back time. (The launch crew is seated but is 
lying on their backs due to the vertical take-off position of the Orbiter.) 
For the TDRS launch, the STS follows a nominal orbit with an inclination of 
28 . Although from lift-off, the communications are provided through two 
ground stations, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA) and Bermuda, the TDRS soon 
takes over and provides real-time contact with the Orbiter as it goes over 
the Atlantic. The data from the IUS and the TDRS being launched that day is
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combined with STS telemetry and relayed to the Johnson Space Center (JSC) via 
the TDRSS network. From JSC, the data is stripped and shipped to the various 
control centers. The IUS data goes to the Consolidated Space Test Center in 
Sunnyvale, California, and the TORS data ends up at the WSGT in New Mexico 
and at the Back-up Project Operations Control Center at the spacecraft 
manufacturers plant in Redondo Beach, California. On a nominal launch, the 
TORS data which gives a continuous look at the state of health and 
performance of those subsystems which are activated for launch, is 
continuously relayed to the WSGT and monitored. A sophisticated system 
designed to support mainly the TORS launch is used to monitor, plot, compare 
and archive all spacecraft data. System and subsystem experts are 
responsible for viewing this data in real-time and reporting go/no-go or 
abnormal conditions to Project Managers. A major advantage of launching on 
the STS is the ability to meaningfully check the performance of the 
spacecraft being launched and return a spacecraft without placing it in orbit 
should a failure develop or even possibly correct a problem, on-orbit but 
prior to deployment, which might have developed during launch.
Once the STS has achieved a successful low-Earth orbit, and all of the TORS 
and IUS systems have been checked and are nominal, the tilt table to which 
the TDRS/IUS is attached is tilted to 58° and the TDRS/IUS is released from 
the Orbiter. About one orbit later, after the Orbiter has backed away to a 
safe distance and the IUS has aligned itself to the proper altitude, the 
first stage of the IUS, a solid rocket motor, ignites and the TORS is on its 
way to a geosynchronous orbit. The IUS thrusts for less than three minutes. 
The coast to a geosynchronous apogee then takes a little more than five 
hours. During this time the IUS performs a slow roll to help maintain 
thermal equilibrium. During this time, a preprogrammed IUS maneuver called a 
dipout is also performed five times at nearly equally spaced intervals. The 
dipouts re-orient the TDRS to point the TDRS communications antenna back 
towards Earth just in case commands are needed to be sent to perhaps 
reconfigure the TDRS. (TDRS telemetry is continuously sent down by being 
multiplexed on the IUS telemetry link.)
Upon reaching the proper altitude, the IUS second stage fires to circularize 
and place the spacecraft into the intended orbit. After holding on to the 
TDRS for a few more minutes to stabilize the spacecraft through the critical 
deployments of the solar arrays, the IUS second stage separates and the TDRS 
is on its own. Several additional complex deployments are then performed and 
the spacecraft is ready for on-orbit checkout and eventual operations,
ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Take time to thoroughly understand STS operations and especially 
safety requirements.
2. Start and maintain interface activities as soon as it is known that 
the STS will be the launch vehicle.
3. Six months to a year prior to the actual launch date, establish a 
semi full-time presence or representation at KSC. GSFC has 
established a permanent office at KSC to perform this function for 
its launches.
4. Interface not only with STS but with co-manifested payloads.
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